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I.

INTRODUCTION

Litigation can be very expensive. The familiar “American
Rule” followed in Minnesota and many other jurisdictions holds
1
that each side bears its own attorneys’ fees and costs.
The
attorneys’ fees associated with bringing an action are often a major
factor in determining whether to bring a claim at all. Similarly, the
attorneys’ fees for both plaintiffs and defendants weigh heavily in
the cost-benefit analysis of whether and at what cost to ultimately
settle a lawsuit. There are, however, many recognized exceptions
to the American Rule where shifting of attorneys’ fees is permitted

† Principal at Minneapolis law firm Gray Plant Mooty
1. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975) (“In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to
collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.”); Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d
302, 314 (Minn. 2000) (holding that under Minnesota’s common law, “each party
bears [its] own attorney fees in the absence of a statutory or contractual
exception”).
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4

by statute, procedural rules, common law, or the terms of a
5
contract.
The underlying policy rationale for fee-shifting statutes and
other fee-shifting mechanisms is sometimes grounded in the
concept of making an injured party whole. As one scholar notes:
Another argument for fee shifting that has a strong
intuitive appeal is that refusing to award fees denies a
wronged party full compensation for his injury. . . .
Undeniably, the American rule’s effect of reducing a
successful plaintiff’s recovery by the amount of his lawyer’s
fee conflicts with the make-whole idea underlying much
6
of the law of remedies.
2. See 3 MARY FRANCES DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT AWARDED
ATTORNEY FEES chs. 29–48 (2012); ALAN HIRSCH & DIANE SHEEHEY, FED. JUD. CTR.,
AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND MANAGING FEE LITIGATION 1 n.3 (2d ed. 2005),
available at http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/attfees2.pdf; see also Marek v.
Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 23 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Congress has enacted
well over 100 attorney’s fees statutes.”).
3. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (signing of pleadings, motions, and other
documents in violation of the rule), 16(f) (noncompliance with rules relating to
pretrial conferences), 26(g) (certification of discovery requests, responses, and
objections), 30(g)(1) (failure of party noticing deposition to attend), 30(g)(2)
(failure of party noticing deposition to properly serve the witness), 37(a)(4)
(conduct necessitating motion to compel discovery), 37(b) (failure to obey
discovery orders), 37(d) (failure to make discovery), 56(h) (summary judgment
affidavits made in bad faith).
4. See DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 2, chs. 2–4; 1 ROBERT L. ROSSI,
ATTORNEYS’ FEES chs. 7–8 (3d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2012). Two of the most widely
recognized exceptions are the common-benefit doctrine and the bad-faith
exception. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Boeing Co. v.
Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980); Milner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 725 N.W.2d 138,
145 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (“The lodestar method is appropriate in cases that
secure a public or common benefit although damages may be small . . . .”); First
Constr. Credit Inc. v. Simonson Lumber of Waite Park, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 14, 19
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“The district court has the discretion to award costs,
disbursements, and reasonable attorney fees if a party acted in bad faith.”); Heller
v. Schwan’s Sales Enters., 548 N.W.2d 287, 291 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (“This
method of allocating attorneys’ fees as a proportion of the recovery for each class
member is acceptable as an application of the common-fund doctrine.”). In
Minnesota, for example, an insured is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs incurred
in establishing coverage where the insurer breaches its obligation to defend the
insured. See In re Silicone Implant Ins. Coverage Litig., 667 N.W.2d 405, 422–23
(Minn. 2003).
5. See ROSSI, supra note 4, ch. 9; TINA L. STARK, NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING
CONTRACT BOILERPLATE 375 (2003) (“Many types of commercial contracts contain
provisions that shift responsibility for the payment of transaction costs, either
generally or with respect to specific items.”).
6. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 657 (1982); see also Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley
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Consistent with the make-whole concept, there is no reason
that fee-shifting is necessarily limited to traditional outside counsel.
In addition to outside counsel, fee-shifting may be appropriate for
the recovery of “in-house” legal fees, such as corporate counsel.
Fee-shifting awards may also be appropriate for government
lawyers, representation of nonprofit organizations, and even
representation of clients in pro bono matters. Careful evaluation
of whether such fees are recoverable can not only potentially boost
the ultimate recovery, but also significantly change the litigation
and settlement dynamics. This article explores whether and to
what extent such fees may be recovered.
II. THE LODESTAR METHOD
The starting point for evaluating potential recovery of in-house
attorneys’ fees is the rules that govern the more common type of
attorneys’ fees awards. Awards of attorneys’ fees are typically
determined by the “lodestar” method (i.e., the number of hours
7
reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate).
8
Like many jurisdictions, Minnesota follows the lodestar method.
Factors considered in determining reasonableness under
Minnesota law include: “the time and labor required; the nature
and difficulty of the responsibility assumed; the amount involved
and the results obtained; the fees customarily charged for similar
legal services; the experience, reputation, and ability of counsel;
9
and the fee arrangement between counsel and the client.” Of
Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (“[T]he aim of such [feeshifting] statutes was to enable private parties to obtain legal help in seeking
redress for injuries resulting from the actual or threatened violation of specific
federal laws.”); Delgadillo v. Astrue, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1246 (D. Colo. 2007)
(“The purpose of fee-shifting statutes is to free the litigant from burdensome
expenses that might chill assertion of valid claims.”); Shuette v. Beazer Homes
Holdings Corp., 124 P.3d 530, 547 (Nev. 2005) (holding that recovery of
attorneys’ fees is “intended to compensate the claimant for legal fees incurred
when he or she is forced to institute a court action to resolve a valid constructional
defect claim by shifting the fees to the defendant”).
7. DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 2, ch. 16.01.
8. Milner, 748 N.W.2d at 620 (citing Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392
N.W.2d 520, 542 (Minn. 1986), which approves of the “sensible and fair approach”
set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)).
9. Id. at 621 (quoting State v. Paulson, 290 Minn. 371, 373, 188 N.W.2d 424,
426 (1971)); see also City of Maple Grove v. Marketline Constr. Capital, LLC, 802
N.W.2d 809, 819 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Paulson, 290 Minn. at 373, 188
N.W.2d at 426); Green v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. A11-581, 2011 Minn. App.
LEXIS 1089, at *24 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2011).
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these factors, “Minnesota courts consider the results obtained
10
critical to the fee award.” In some circumstances, the lodestar
11
may be enhanced or reduced depending on the success. “[A]n
upward adjustment of the lodestar amount is warranted only in
12
rare cases of exceptional success.”
III. RECOVERY OF IN-HOUSE ATTORNEYS’ FEES
A.

Are In-House Counsel Fees Recoverable?

Because in-house lawyers are salaried and typically do not bill
their clients for their services, the initial issue is whether the costs
associated with those services are recoverable from an adverse
party. A number of state and federal courts have permitted the
13
recovery of in-house attorneys’ fees. Recovery of such fees has
10. First State Bank of Floodwood v. Jubie, 86 F.3d 755, 761 (8th Cir. 1996)
(citing Specialized Tours, 392 N.W.2d at 542).
11. Milner, 748 N.W.2d at 624 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897
(1984)). Note that although success is not necessarily dependent on the amount
at issue in the case, the amount may be relevant in determining the
reasonableness of hours expended. See Darula v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. A111457, 2012 Minn. App. LEXIS 440, at *15 (Minn. Ct. App. May 21, 2012). But see
Green, 2011 Minn. App. LEXIS 1089, at *24 (“[W]e disagree that a district court
should consider the amount involved in the litigation when awarding attorney
fees,” as this approach may undermine the purpose of fee-shifting provisions.).
12. Milner, 748 N.W.2d at 624 (internal quotation marks omitted) (rejecting
the district court’s award of a 1.5 multiplier for claims under section 177.27,
subdivision 10 of the Minnesota Fair Labor Standards Act, where “the jury
completely rejected the plaintiffs’ claim for millions of dollars in unpaid overtime
compensation and the plaintiffs recovered no back pay or other monetary relief”).
13. See, e.g., Smith v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 959 F.2d 655,
660–61 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming an award of sanctions under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that included in-house counsel fees); Textor v.
Bd. of Regents of N. Ill. Univ., 711 F.2d 1387, 1396 (7th Cir. 1983) (concluding
that defendant with in-house counsel was entitled to share in attorneys’ fees award:
“a prevailing party’s decision as to how to engage counsel should have no bearing
upon the court’s decision to punish malfeasant counsel”); Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 281 F.2d 538, 542 (3d Cir. 1960) (awarding
reasonable fees for in-house counsel in an insurance contract case); Rodriquez v.
City of New York, 721 F. Supp. 2d 148, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Nor is there any
problem with awarding attorneys’ fees to in-house counsel if such fees would be
awarded for the same work performed by outside counsel.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 199 F. Supp. 2d 964,
965, 969 (D. Neb. 2002) (awarding plaintiff attorneys’ fees, which included fees
for in-house counsel, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. R Bar
of Manhattan, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 656, 660–61 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (awarding in-house
attorneys’ fees pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505); Perez v. Velez, 629 F. Supp. 734, 736–
38 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (awarding fees to corporate counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 1988);
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14

been allowed in Minnesota.
As the California Supreme Court
explained:
We discern no basis for discriminating between counsel
working for a corporation in-house and private counsel
engaged with respect to a specific matter or on retainer.
Both are bound by the same fiduciary and ethical duties
to their clients. Both are qualified to provide, and do
provide, equivalent legal services.
And both incur
attorney fees and costs within the meaning of Civil Code
section 1717 in enforcing the contract on behalf of their
15
client.
Apart from the traditional in-house corporate context, a number of
courts have awarded legal fees to lawyers representing government
16
17
non-profit organizations,
and even pro bono
agencies,
Scott Paper Co. v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 835, 837 (D. Del. 1984)
(finding in-house counsel fees to be “reasonable attorney fees” under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285 and concluding that there is no reason in law or equity why the client’s
choice to proceed with some work through its own legal department was not
recoverable); Johnston v. Detroit Hoist & Crane Co., 370 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1985) (noting that reasonable salary of in-house counsel attributable to work
performed in products liability case may be awarded); Tesoro Petroleum Co. v.
Coastal Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 754 S.W.2d 764, 766–67 (Tex. App. 1988) (concluding
that award of attorneys’ fees for services of Coastal Refining Corporation’s inhouse counsel was proper and did not violate public policy or the Code of
Professional Responsibility); Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 1 P.3d
1095, 1106 (Utah 2000) (determining claimant “was required to pay consideration
for the legal services received from its in-house counsel in the form of salary and
other costs of employment” and “was entitled to attorney fees for the legal services
of its in-house counsel”).
14. 3M Co. v. Mohan, Civ. No. 09-1413 ADM/FLN, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5482, at *14–15 (D. Minn. Jan. 19, 2011); In re Trust of Great N. Iron Ore Props.,
311 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Minn. 1981) (permitting attorneys’ fee award for services of
legal counsel and concluding that claimant “need not establish that it incurred
additional expenses with respect to the employment of house counsel in order to
justify an allowance for their services from the trust”).
15. PLCM Grp, Inc. v. Drexler, 997 P.2d 511, 517–18 (Cal. 2000) (footnote
omitted) (citations omitted).
16. See, e.g., Textor, 711 F.2d at 1396 (permitting recovery of attorneys’ fees of
salaried in-house counsel of university); United States v. Meyers, 363 F.2d 615, 621
(5th Cir. 1966) (finding no sound reason to deny the government reimbursement
“merely because the attorneys representing the United States are Government
employees, and are paid a salary by the United States for performing their
services”); In re Outdoor Sports Headquarters, Inc., 161 B.R. 414, 427 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1993) (rejecting the argument that the salary of the Special Assistant U.S.
Attorney representing the Small Business Administration was an expense incurred
without regard to the work required in the proceeding and hence not recoverable
under the note at issue).
17. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892–96 (1984) (concluding that in
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18

matters. This is consistent with the concept that fee-shifting is to
promote adequate representation and make the prevailing party
19
whole.
Some courts, however, have found that in-house counsel fees
are not recoverable. One rationale for this position is that in-house
20
attorneys’ fees are included within overhead. Another rationale
for this position is that the attorney was acting in a “liaison”
capacity between the lawyers working on the matter and the
21
client. Thus, where counsel acts more in the role of the client or
relaying client views and instructions, the more likely such activities
22
will be viewed as “liaison” activities and thus not recoverable.
a civil rights action, reasonable fees “are to be calculated according to prevailing
market rates in relevant community regardless of whether plaintiff is represented
by private or nonprofit counsel”); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 672
F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (awarding attorneys’ fees to non-profit under federal
statute); Consumer Union of U.S., Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
410 F. Supp. 63, 65 (D.D.C. 1975) (granting attorneys’ fees to non-profit consumer
educational organization when litigation was conducted by in-house attorneys);
Shapiro v. Chapman, 520 A.2d 1330, 1334 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (concluding
the prevailing party in a civil rights action is entitled to attorneys’ fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 even if they “were represented by publicly funded, non-profit law
office”).
18. See, e.g., Brown v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 980 S.W.2d 675, 683–84
(Tex. App. 1998) (holding state bar represented by private lawyers on a pro bono
basis may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees); see also John F. Amer, Attorney’s Fees
for In-House Counsel in Contract Actions, 23 L.A. LAW. 24, 26 (2000) (“Drexler’s
reasoning supports recovery of fees in a multitude of situations, including pro
bono representation, discounted rates, contingency fees, and other fee
arrangements. The decision also appears to have resolved in the affirmative
whether a governmental entity can recover attorney’s fees for services performed
by its own, salaried attorney as the prevailing party in a contract action.”).
19. See Rowe, Jr., supra note 6, at 657.
20. See Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1499 (11th Cir. 1983)
(holding that under Florida law, attorneys’ fees are recoverable as a matter of
indemnification, and since the company did not pay out additional money for the
services of in-house counsel, it could not claim reimbursement for this pro-rata
share of its fixed corporate expense); see also In re Cummins Util., L.P., 279 B.R.
195, 207 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (denying motion for in-house counsel fees on
the grounds that “[t]his item should be included in . . . overhead”).
21. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bender, 182 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(reversing and remanding award of in-house attorneys’ fees, in part, on the
grounds that “it is not possible to determine, from the FDIC’s submissions, how
much of the time in-house counsel did devote was in a capacity other than that of
a mere liaison between the agency and the Justice Department attorneys who
represented it in this case, a function for which the recovery of fees is not
permitted”); Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 761 F.2d 553, 558
(9th Cir. 1985) (“Of course, if in-house counsel are not actively participating (e.g.,
acting only as liaison), fees should not be awarded.”).
22. See El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. Trayler Bros., Inc., NO. CIV. S-03-949
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Where, however, in-house counsel is experienced as to the
matters at issue and actively participates in the litigation, such fees
have been found to be reasonable and recoverable. The rationale
is that if in-house attorneys “had refrained from activity, the
workload and consequently the fee application of [outside counsel]
23
would have been increased.” Moreover, such fees are recoverable
on the grounds that for every hour that in-house counsel spent on
the matter, the client lost an hour of legal services that could have
24
been spent on other matters.
B.

How Is the Amount of In-House Attorneys’ Fees Computed?

Most courts award attorneys’ fees for services provided by inhouse counsel by computing the value of their services in the same
manner as fees are computed for outside counsel, which is referred
25
to as the market value or market rate approach. This is basically
the familiar “lodestar” method (i.e., the number of hours
LKK/GGH, 2007 WL 512428, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007) (deducting from fee
application the hours in-house counsel “appears to have been acting as a client
representative and not as an attorney”).
23. Scott Paper Co. v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 835, 837 (D. Del.
1984).
24. See Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 1 P.3d 1095, 1106 (Utah
2000) (“[Claimant] was required to pay consideration for the legal services
received from its in-house counsel in the form of salary and other costs of
employment” and was “entitled to attorney fees for the legal services of its in-house
counsel.”).
25. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Cartage Co., 76 F.3d
114, 115–16 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding pension fund represented by in-house
counsel entitled to attorneys’ fees at market value); Milgard Tempering, 761 F.2d at
558 (instructing district court on remand to examine the “modern trend” toward
calculating fees based on market rate); Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Martino,
Nos. CIV.A. 92-7245, CIV.A. 92-2131, CIV.A. 92-2253, 1993 WL 541680, at *15
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1993) (“The Third Circuit has indicated that there is nothing
improper about a market rate calculation for attorney fee awards for salaried in
house counsel.”), vacated on other grounds, 36 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1994); Zacharias v.
Shell Oil Co., 627 F. Supp. 31, 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Compensating in-house or
salaried employees by using an hourly rate is commonly used by courts in
awarding attorneys’ fees.”); PLCM Grp. v. Drexler, 997 P.2d 511, 517, 519 (Cal.
2000) (approving of a calculation of in-house attorneys’ fees based on the
“prevailing market rate”); Balkind v. Telluride Mountain Title Co., 8 P.3d 581, 588
(Colo. App. 2000) (“Salaried and public interest attorneys should be awarded
attorney fees based on the prevailing market rate rather than a ‘cost-plus’
approach focusing on the attorney’s salary.”); AMX Enters., L.L.P. v. Master Realty
Corp., 283 S.W.3d 506, 519 (Tex. App. 2009) (“We are persuaded by the logic of
those jurisdictions that apply the market value method to calculate in-house
counsel’s attorney’s fees. The market value method has the virtue of being
predictable for the parties and easy to administer.”).
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reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate).
27
Other courts award fees using a “cost-plus” method. Regardless of
which method is ultimately used, the burden is on the party seeking
the award to meet all of the applicable elements. It is therefore
important to be familiar with the rules and applicable factors for
recovering in-house counsel fees, as well as developing a game plan
for meeting those factors throughout the course of the litigation.
1.

Lodestar or Market Rate Method

Courts favoring the market value approach view it as being
more predictable for the parties and easier to administer, while the
cost-plus approach is viewed as cumbersome, intrusive, and costly,
distorting the incentives for settlement and rewarding
28
inefficiency. In order to establish the hours reasonably expended,
in-house counsel should maintain contemporaneous time records
29
in sufficient detail to demonstrate what services were provided.

26. See DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 2, ch. 16.01 (quoting Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
27. Softsolutions, 1 P.3d at 1107 (“We are convinced that a cost-plus rate is the
more reasonable measure of attorney fees to in-house counsel, and is consistent
with the public policy that the basic purpose of attorney fees is to indemnify the
prevailing party and not to punish the losing party by allowing the winner a
windfall profit.”); see also PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840
F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Goodrich v. Dep’t of the Navy, 733 F.2d 1578,
1579–80 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury,
656 F.2d 848, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Lacer v. Navajo Cnty., 687 P.2d 400, 404 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1984).
28. See Balkind, 8 P.3d at 588 (“Salaried and public interest attorneys should
be awarded attorney fees based on prevailing market rate rather than a ‘cost-plus’
approach focusing on the attorney’s salary.”); see also Amer, supra note 18, at 26
(“By refusing to distinguish between private counsel and other counsel in the
determination of fee awards in contract actions, Drexler has removed one nasty
element of today’s contentious litigation by obviating any basis for full-scale
discovery of corporate counsel’s compensation or any other confidential attorneyclient fee arrangement.”).
29. Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Solutions Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 991,
1008 (D. Minn. 2010) (“In support of its fee request, Trans Union submitted a
table displaying the number of hours spent on seven different categories of tasks:
(1) analysis and investigation of the breach allegations; (2) work in connection
with securing a protective order regarding algorithms; (3) work on a motion to
compel Fair Isaac to specify the trade secret that was allegedly misappropriated;
(4) discovery related to the breach of contract claim; (5) working with experts; (6)
work on the motion for summary judgment; and (7) preparation of the pending
motion for fees. In addition, Trans Union has submitted the supporting billing
entries, showing in detail the work Trans Union’s attorneys performed relating to
the breach of contract claim.”).
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This is basically no different from what outside counsel routinely
submit in support of a fee application. Courts are used to seeing
fairly detailed submissions that accompany fee applications and
may reduce or outright deny a claim for in-house counsel fees
where time records are vague, incomplete, or created after the
30
fact. The submissions should include the identity of the attorney
who rendered the services, a description of the services provided,
31
and the amount of time devoted to the matter. Care must be
taken not to simply dump voluminous time records on the court
without an explanation of the rates charged or an explanation of
32
the services rendered. To the extent that one or more of the
30. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bender, 182 F.3d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (reversing and remanding award of in-house attorneys’ fees, in part, on the
grounds that the time in-house counsel devoted to the case was insufficiently
documented); In re Donovan, 877 F.2d 982, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (requiring “that
fee applications include contemporaneous time records of hours worked and rates
claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of the work with
supporting documents, if any”); 3M Co. v. Mohan, Civ. No. 09-1413 ADM/FLN,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5482, at *16–17 (D. Minn. Jan. 19, 2011) (finding the
lodestar amount not entirely reasonable because “some hours claimed by both
Merchant & Gould and 3M in house counsel are not fully documented[; f]or
example, over 150 Merchant & Gould hours are broadly listed as ‘trial
preparation,’ and in-house counsel’s hours are largely estimated.”); United States
ex rel. Thompson v. Walgreen Co., 621 F. Supp. 2d 710, 728 (D. Minn. 2009)
(“Based on the Court’s line-by-line review, the Court recommends a reduction in
the amount of $40,000, or approximately 8% of the total requested amount for
fees and costs, to account for billing entries so vague that the Court is unable to
determine whether or not the hours claimed were justified.”); Broad. Music, Inc. v.
R Bar of Manhattan, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 656, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[M]otions for
attorney’s fees must be based on contemporaneous time records specifying
relevant dates, time spent and work done,” and “hindsight review is not an
adequate substitute for contemporaneous time records.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Ward v. Brown, 899 F. Supp. 123, 128 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (reducing
claim when no contemporaneous records were kept on the grounds that “an afterthe-fact reconstruction presents the danger that the attorney’s memory, and his
estimates of how long it would have taken to perform various tasks, could be
faulty”); 301 Clifton Place L.L.C. v. 301 Clifton Place Condo. Ass’n, 783 N.W.2d
551, 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming attorneys’ fee award under section
515B.4-116 of the Minnesota Common Interest Ownership Act based on “an
affidavit with an attached spreadsheet showing detailed accounts of work
performed and matching billing rates”).
31. See, e.g., AMX Enters., L.L.P. v. Master Realty Corp., 283 S.W.3d 506, 515
(Tex. App. 2009) (in-house counsel submitted a sixteen-page affidavit in support
of fee application, attached to which was sixteen pages of time entries reflecting
work performed on the case through the end of trial); see also ROSSI, supra note 4,
app. A, form 32.
32. See Bores v. Domino’s Pizza L.L.C., No. 05-2498 (RHK/JSM), 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 87252, at *15 n.8 (D. Minn. Oct. 27, 2008) (“Here, Dominos has
(inappropriately) opted to dump on the Court the voluminous time records of its
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underlying claims may be subject to recovery of attorneys’ fees and
others may not, the attorneys’ time entries should clearly segregate
time between legal work related to recoverable claims and non33
recoverable claims. The time entries should also delineate and
exclude what arguably might be characterized as “liaison”
34
activities. The failure to properly segregate may be fatal to the
claim.
In some instances, the party opposing the fee application may
even retain an expert to audit the bills as part of the challenge to
35
the fee application. Careful practitioners should therefore expect
a vigorous examination of their fee applications, especially where
large awards are at stake, and prepare a fee application that
addresses anticipated issues.
Keep in mind that the attorneys’ time records may have to be
produced in discovery as part of the fee award application
36
process.
Therefore, to the extent possible, the time records
should describe what was done, but not reveal the substance of
counsel, with little explanation concerning the hourly rates charged and even less
explanation of the propriety of the hours expended.”).
33. See, e.g., Sw. Stainless, L.P. v. Sappington, No. 07-CV-0334-CVE-TLW, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36211, at *24–26 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 13, 2010) (requiring
apportionment between fee-bearing and non-fee-bearing claims); AMX Enters., 283
S.W.3d at 522–23 (remanding the matter to the trial court because the claimant
failed to segregate fees or demonstrate that the fees associated with recoverable
claims were so intertwined with the non-recoverable claims that the fees need not
be segregated).
34. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill. v. Millard Refrigerated Servs., No.
8:00CV91, 2002 WL 2005717, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 3, 2002) (plaintiff appropriately
did not seek attorneys’ fees for time spent in various meetings as a mere liaison);
Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1052 (D. Minn.
2001), aff’d, 290 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Declaration of Hildy Bowbeer in
Support of Claim for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses at ¶ 7, 3M Co., 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5482 (Civ. No. 09-1413 ADM/FLN), Doc. No. 216 (“In addition, in this case
I and other members of the 3M in-house legal staff played a significant role in
accomplishing tasks that otherwise would have been performed, and billed, by
outside counsel. These tasks went far beyond the typical in-house counsel’s role as
‘liaison’ between outside counsel and our business client.”). See generally 1
DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 2, ch. 12.
35. See, e.g., King v. Turner, No. 05-388 (JRT/FLN), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30214, at *5 (D. Minn. Apr. 24, 2007) (“Defendant submitted an affidavit of James
P. Schratz that audits the fee request, and argues that the hours expended should
be reduced as indicated in the auditor’s report.”).
36. See 2 DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 2, ch. 25; EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 72–75 (4th ed.
2001). But see Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Solutions Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d
991, 1008 n.4 (D. Minn. 2010) (permitting in camera submission of billing entries
for review by the court).
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attorney-client communications or attorney work product. It may
be possible to redact sensitive entries prior to producing them or
submitting them to the court, but there is a risk that the redactions
will be successfully challenged, thereby potentially exposing
privileged communications or work product. Heavy redaction, on
the other hand, may lead the court to conclude that time was not
37
reasonably necessary.
As part of the fee application, it is necessary to establish a
reasonable hourly rate for the attorney, including for in-house legal
38
services.
“When determining a reasonable hourly rate, the
relevant legal community is the forum in which the district court
39
sits.”
For outside counsel, this is sometimes accomplished
40
through the use of comparable billing rate surveys. These are
usually specific to a geographical area and are typically broken
down by size of firm, type of activity (e.g., business law, corporate
law, litigation, real estate, estate planning), and year the attorney
was admitted to practice. Supporting affidavits from professional
colleagues in the legal community with similar practices have also
41
been used to support the reasonableness of hourly rates. These
37. See Bores, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87252, at *23 (“Similarly, Dominos’
counsel has heavily redacted the time sheets submitted with the Motion, and those
redactions generally leave the Court in the dark as to the precise nature of the
work performed. Courts routinely reduce fee requests where redactions leave it
impossible to discern the appropriateness of counsel’s work.”). Where heavy
redaction is necessary, it is advisable to submit the unredacted time records to the
court in camera. Id. at *23–24.
38. See Zacharias v. Shell Oil Co., 627 F. Supp. 31, 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“[Inhouse counsel’s] hourly billing rate was carefully calculated by determining the
value of his service in Shell’s in-house legal department.”).
39. Fair Isaac, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (“The rates charged by Trans Union’s
Chicago lawyers are substantially higher than the rates charged by its Minneapolis
lawyers with comparable years of experience.”); see also Bores, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
87252, at *18–19 (“Dominos has made no attempt to justify the use of out-of-town
counsel (with very high rates) to assist it in this matter. . . . Nor does the Court
believe that these hourly rates are in line with those charged by lawyers of similar
skill and experience in the Twin Cities area.”).
40. See B-K Lighting, Inc. v. Vision3 Lighting, No. CV 06-02825 MMM (PLAx),
2009 WL 3838264, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009) (“Courts also frequently use
survey data in evaluating the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees.”); Milner v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 748 N.W.2d 608, 622 (Minn. 2008) (concluding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that hourly rates charged
by plaintiffs’ attorneys were reasonable based on a “detailed study,” which
“evidenc[ed] that their respective hourly rates are comparable to those charged by
equally competent attorneys and paralegals in their respective communities”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
41. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Walgreen Co., 621 F. Supp. 2d 710, 714
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methods are not readily available to in-house counsel. Comparable
billing rates may, however, be established indirectly through billing
42
rate surveys or fees charged by independent counsel. In addition,
many companies routinely retain outside law firms on various types
of matters and in different areas of the country. The billing rates
for these firms can be used as a surrogate to establish comparable
billing rates for in-house legal services.
2.

Cost-Plus Approach

A number of courts utilize the cost-plus approach for awards of
43
in-house attorneys’ fees. The rationale for this approach is that
the market-rate approach would award the salaried attorney’s
44
employer with a windfall profit. Under the cost-plus approach,
(D. Minn. 2009) (five affidavits from local attorneys submitted in support of
reasonableness of hourly rate); Bores, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87252, at *19
(“Typically, such evidence would include affidavits from other lawyers opining on
the reasonableness of the rates or citations to similar cases in which fees were
awarded.”); Turner v. Gonzales, Civ. No. 01-1407 JMR/AJB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96420, at *24 (D. Minn. Nov. 20, 2007) (affidavit of James M. Gilbert, former
Associate Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, submitted in support of
plaintiff’s claim of success on the merits); King v. Turner, Civ. No. 05-388
(JRT/FLN), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30214, at *4 (D. Minn. Apr. 24, 2007) (finding
that two local attorneys who submitted affidavits in support of reasonable hourly
rates were “well-qualified to opine on the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees in this
jurisdiction”); Green v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, A11-581, 2011 Minn. App. LEXIS
1089, at *23 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2011) (affirming fee award and noting that
“[t]he district court considered the experience of the attorneys, the affidavit
testimony of other attorneys in the community as to a reasonable hourly rate for
the work performed, and attorney-fee orders in other Minnesota consumer-rights
cases, all of which indicate attorney fees of $350 to $375 are within the range of
market rates”). But see In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. PSLRA Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d
1094, 1101–02 (D. Minn. 2009) (rejecting expert opinion submitted in support of
fee award in securities case).
42. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. R Bar of Manhattan, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 656, 661
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[A]n hourly rate based on an estimate of the fee charged by
independent counsel for similar services can provide a reasonable basis for
calculating such an award if other relevant criteria are satisfied.”).
43. See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d
1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[I]n this circuit reasonable rates for in-house
counsel may be calculated on cost plus overhead.”); Dana Corp. v. NOK, Inc., No.
86-CV-74903-DT, 1988 WL 156807, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 1988); In re Stewart
v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., No. 00-00046, 02-10020, 2004 WL 3130573, at *16
(Bankr. D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2004) (holding contract provision awarding attorneys’
fees “incurred” by prevailing party precluded application of market value method
to calculate in-house counsel’s fees); Lacer v. Navajo Cnty., 687 P.2d 400, 404
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 1 P.3d 1095,
1107 (Utah 2000).
44. Softsolutions, 1 P.3d at 1107; see also Devine v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union,
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fees for in-house counsel are limited to consideration actually paid
or for which the party is obligated, calculated using a cost-plus rate.
This methodology takes into account: (1) the proportionate share
of the party’s attorney salaries, including benefits, which are
allocable to the case based on the time expended; plus (2)
allocated shares of the overhead expenses, which may include the
costs of office space, support staff, office equipment and supplies,
law library and continuing legal education, and similar expenses.
Under the cost-plus method, it will still be necessary for the
attorney to keep timely and accurate time records. Moreover, it
may be necessary to reveal attorneys’ salaries and benefits within
the company or organization, which may be a sensitive issue. In
some instances, legal departments track their costs and charge
them back to their clients. This provides a ready basis for
developing cost-plus information. If not, it will likely be necessary
to involve the financial or accounting department to develop the
necessary data for presentation to the court.
IV. PRACTICAL STEPS: BEST PRACTICES
An award of attorneys’ fees is left to the sound discretion of
45
the trial court and will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion.
Judicial scrutiny of applications for such awards varies widely and
can be influenced by any number of factors. In order to increase
the chances of successfully recovering in-house legal fees, counsel
should consider the practical steps and best practices set forth
below.
A. Expressly Include Recovery of In-House Fees in the Contract. Feeshifting provisions are common in many contracts.
These
provisions typically provide that a party may be liable for
“reasonable attorneys’ fees” or “legal costs.” These terms are
frequently not defined. At the contract drafting stage, it is
important to make sure that the contract expressly provides for the
recovery of in-house attorneys’ fees and perhaps the basis by which
those fees will be computed. In the event of a dispute, this will
reduce the potential for an argument that in-house legal costs are
805 F.2d 384, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (concluding that fee awards to unions should
be limited to the union’s actual costs of litigation on the grounds that to award
anything other than actual costs would be unethical because the union would get a
windfall by receiving more than the litigation had actually cost the union).
45. See, e.g., Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng’g Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661
(Minn. 1987).
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not contemplated by the parties and thus are not recoverable.
Even if the contract provides for the recovery of in-house fees,
these fees are usually limited to the recovery of attorneys’ fees and
costs associated with a breach or collection and post-judgment
remedies. There is no reason, however, why fee-shifting cannot be
used in negotiating certain types of business transactions. For
example, a significant loan transaction may provide that if the
borrower rejects the terms and conditions proposed by the lender
and instead proposes extensive modifications, the borrower shall
reimburse the lender for its reasonable in-house legal costs and
expenses incurred in connection with the negotiations relating to
modifications of the loan transaction.
B. Identify the Nature of the Claims and Defenses at Issue. At the
outset of any litigation, it is important to identify the claims and
defenses at issue in the litigation, whether those claims or defenses
provide for recovery of attorneys’ fees, and, if so, under what
conditions. If it is a breach of contract case, check to see if there is
a fee-shifting provision in the contract and, if so, whether it
expressly includes in-house legal fees or is broad enough to include
such fees. If there is a statutory claim, check to see if attorneys’ fees
are permitted and under what conditions. Where the case has
multiple claims or causes of action (some of which may allow for
recovery of attorneys’ fees and some of which may not), time
entries should reflect work on discrete aspects of the case (e.g.,
breach of contract claim, statutory claim). That way, it is much
easier to assemble the fee petition and for the court to easily
distinguish between recoverable and non-recoverable work.
C. Assess the Likely Methodology of Computing the In-House Counsel
Award. It is important to determine early in the case what method
the court will most likely use in computing the fee award (e.g.,
lodestar or cost-plus). If the fee-shifting provision permits recovery
for legal costs “incurred,” it may be necessary to utilize the cost-plus
approach. If cost-plus is the likely method, begin to develop an
early strategy for assembling the necessary corporate or
organizational financial data. If lodestar is the likely method,
immediately begin to document time spent working on the matter
and assemble comparable rate data.
D. Take an Active Role in the Case. The goal here is to
demonstrate that in-house counsel provided substantive legal
services on behalf of the client akin to those provided by outside
counsel. There are a variety of ways for in-house counsel to
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establish active participation in the representation of the client.
For example, it is possible for in-house counsel to be listed as “of
counsel” on the pleadings or to be admitted pro hac vice for the
matter. Keep in mind, however, that a formal appearance in the
proceeding subjects the attorney to all of the duties and
responsibilities of trial counsel. In addition, in-house counsel can
actively participate in depositions and other discovery activities. An
appearance “on the record” at important hearings and trial may
demonstrate active participation. Time entries can also reflect
substantive legal work, such as researching specific legal issues in
the case, responding to discovery requests, drafting pleadings, and
developing strategy for the case.
E. Develop a Detailed Biography to Support the Hourly Role. Inhouse counsel should be prepared to provide the court his or her
relevant experience and expertise in the matter at issue. This is
typically done through an affidavit or declaration describing the
attorney’s professional background, practical experience, and role
46
in the case. If in-house counsel brings particular expertise to the
case (e.g., patent expertise for company products), that should be
highlighted as well.
F. Keep Contemporaneous Time Records. Many lawyers who have
transitioned to in-house positions are grateful to be relieved of the
tedium of having to keep daily time sheets. However, it is back to
time sheets if in-house counsel expects a court to award those fees.
Moreover, time records must be kept contemporaneously. Post
hoc reconstruction of the attorney’s services may very likely be
47
rejected outright or result in a significantly reduced award. More
detailed time entries may be required under the lodestar approach,
but regardless, contemporaneous and accurate time records are
essential to a successful award. Some important tips:
46. See AMX Enters., L.L.P. v. Master Realty Corp., 283 S.W.3d 506, 520 (Tex.
App. 2009) (noting that in-house counsel’s “affidavit and time records recited the
time and labor required to represent AMX, the fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar legal services, the amounts involved, [in-house counsel’s]
experience and ability, and the reasonableness and necessity of fees”); see also
DERFNER & WOLF, supra note 2, ch. 24.04.
47. See, e.g., Sw. Stainless, L.P. v. Sappington, No. 07-CV-0334-CVE-TLW, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36211, at *35–36 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 13, 2010) (“The Court finds
that the timekeepers’ mere recollections about the time spent on specific tasks,
many of which were performed over one year before the reconstruction, are not
reliable. Further, plaintiffs’ unreliable reconstructed time records remain
imprecise and made it impossible for the Court to apportion fees by reviewing the
records line by line.”).
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A daily log or timesheet should record the services provided to
the client, including the identity of the attorney or paralegal
involved in rendering the services.
Avoid “blocked billing.” “The term ‘blocked billing’ refers to
the ‘time-keeping method by which each lawyer and legal
assistant enters the total daily time spent working on a case,
48
rather than itemizing the time expended on specific tasks.’”
Some courts have noted that blocked billing is a problem in
49
fee-shifting cases.
Each entry should therefore identify a
50
discrete task and record time devoted to that task.
Use reasonable time increments. The time allocated to a
particular task should reflect the time actually spent working
51
on the task rather than minimum billing increments.
Avoid “over lawyering.”
Lawyers obviously need to
communicate with one another, but some courts react
negatively to what they perceive as over lawyering. Examples
include multiple conferences and numerous attorneys
appearing at depositions and court hearings.

48. Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1284 n.9 (10th Cir. 1998).
49. See Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(reducing requested hours because counsel’s practice of blocked billing
“lump[ed] together multiple tasks, making it impossible to evaluate their
reasonableness”); Aranda v. Astrue, No. CV 08-340-MA, 2011 WL 2413996, at *5
(D. Or. June 8, 2011) (“Blocked billing, which bundles tasks in a block of time,
makes it extremely difficult for a court to evaluate the reasonableness of the
number of hours expended.”); Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Apache Corp., 355 F.
Supp. 2d 1246, 1264 (N.D. Okla. 2004) (“Block billing is a critical problem where,
for example, plaintiff alleges claims for which fees may be shifted and others for
which fee-shifting is not appropriate.”).
50. See Stewart v. Capital City Mortg. Corp. (In re Stewart), No. 00-00046
(Chapter 13), 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2185, at *72 (Bankr. D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2004)
(disallowing in-house attorneys’ fees because of “lumping”).
51. See Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948–49 (9th Cir. 2007)
(approving an across-the-board twenty percent reduction for time billed in
quarter-hour increments for phone calls, email, or the preparation and review of
letters or documents); Coronado v. Astrue, 1:10-cv-00594-AWI-SKO, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55259, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2012) (“Six-minute billing increments,
which is how Ms. Bosavanh’s time entries are recorded and presented, can be
problematic when small tasks that require less than six minutes are recorded
separately. Six-minute billing increments can result in a rounding-up that overcalculates the time actually spent on the tasks in total.”); Melone v. Paul Evert’s RV
Country, Inc., Case No. 2:08-cv-00868-GWF, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47408, at *16
(D. Nev. Apr. 4, 2012) (reducing hours by twenty percent for matters billed at 0.3
and 0.4 hours).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss1/10

16

Nierengarten: Fee-Shifting: The Recovery of In-house Legal Fees

2012]

FEE-SHIFTING

243



The time entries should demonstrate substantive legal work
52
devoted to the matter (not “ministerial” activities).
 In-house activities that reflect “liaison” functions should be
53
separately logged and excluded from the application.
 To the extent possible, comply with the organization’s billing
guidelines or expectations for outside counsel.
Many
companies have corporate policies regarding services
rendered by outside counsel.
Some include detailed
requirements regarding budgeting, staffing, fees, and time
entries.
For example, some companies require outside
counsel to charge time to activity or task codes, which are then
submitted electronically. While in-house counsel may not be
subject to these requirements, the failure to follow corporate
policies may undermine a successful fee application.
 Where part of a claim may be subject to fee-shifting, but not
another part, time entries should clearly segregate between
recoverable and non-recoverable activities.
G. Critically Scrutinize the Fee Application. As noted above, courts
have wide discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees. The application
for such an award is no less important than any other submission to
the court. It should clearly provide the legal and factual basis for
the award, including supporting affidavits or declarations. Tables
summarizing voluminous statistical and financial information are
particularly well received.
Finally, make a good faith and

52. In re Stewart, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2185, at *59 n.29, *65 (disallowing inhouse attorneys’ fees that were “ministerial in character requiring no significant
attorney involvement” and “for lack of clarity and lack of specificity”).
53. Id. at *47 (“Attorney’s fees for services of in-house counsel who act
primarily as liaisons between the client and outside counsel are not recoverable
under a contractual or statutory provision for the recovery of attorney’s fees.”).
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conservative effort to exclude from any application or petition fees
that might be considered excessive, redundant, or otherwise
54
unnecessary.
The application should specifically describe any
such reductions.

54. See, e.g., In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. PSLRA Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1094,
1106 (D. Minn. 2009) (“Counsel are expected to exercise billing judgment in their
fee application, making a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours
that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” (internal quotations and
citation omitted)); see also Nelson v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. 11-1161
(RHK/FLN), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26982, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Mar. 1, 2012)
(reducing plaintiffs’ fee petition of over $159,000 to $27,000, in part, on the
grounds that the relatively small amount at issue and the “simple” issue in the
matter should not “have necessitated the involvement of five separate attorneys,
including one who billed as much as $480 per hour, as Plaintiffs’ fee request
indicates”); Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1049,
1052 (D. Minn. 2001), aff’d, 290 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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